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Abstract 
 
Blind Signatures are a special type of digital signatures which possess two special properties of 
blindness and untraceability, which are important for today‟s real world applications that require 
authentication , integrity , security , anonymity and privacy.  
            David Chaum was the first to propose the concept of blind signatures. The scheme's 
security was based on the difficulty of solving the factoring problem. Two properties that are 
important for a blind signature scheme in order to be used in various modern applications are 
blindness and untraceability. Blindness means that the signer is not able to know the contents of 
the message while signing it, which is achieved by disguising (or blinding) the message through 
various methods. Untraceability refers to preventing the signer from linking the blinded message 
it signs to a later unblinded version that it may be called upon to verify. 
            Blind signatures based on discrete logarithm problem are still an area with much scope 
for research. We aim to propose a novel blind signature scheme with untraceability , based on the 
discrete logarithm problem. 
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1   Introduction 
A digital signature or digital signature scheme is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the 
authenticity of a digital message or document. A valid digital signature gives a recipient or 
receiver reason to believe that the message was created & sent by a known or trusted sender. 
Digital signatures are commonly used for software distribution, financial transactions, electronic 
voting and in other situations where it is important to detect forgery or tampering. Along with 
authentication, digital signatures also possess the property of integrity, which ensures that the 
received messages are not manipulated or modified or altered during the transmission of message 
from sender to receiver . Due to its importance and in order to use it in various kinds of 
applications, many types of digital signature scheme have been proposed such as blind signature 
, group signature , undeniable signature etc . 
               In the field of cryptography, a blind signature scheme, introduced by David 
Chaum[2]
]
 is a special type of digital signature scheme in which the content of a message is 
hidden or disguised (blinded) before it is signed. The resulting blind signature obtained can be 
publicly verified against the original unblinded message in the manner of a normal digital 
signature. Blind signatures are usually used protocols or applications requiring privacy and 
anonymity , where the signer and message author are two different parties , for example in 
applications like cryptographic election systems and digital cash schemes. 
               An often used analogy to the blind signature scheme is the physical act of enclosing a 
message in a special 'write through' capable envelope, which after being sealed is signed by a 
signer or signing agent. Thus, the signer can not determine the message content, but a third party 
can later verify the signature and know that the signature is valid within the limitations of the 
underlying signature scheme . 
              Blind signatures can also be used to provide untraceability or unlinkability, which 
prevents the signer from linking the blinded message it signs, to a later unblinded version that it 
may be called upon to verify. In order to achieve this, the signer's response is first unblinded" 
prior to verification in such a way that the signature remains valid for the unblinded message. 
This can be useful in schemes or applications where anonymity is required, such as e-voting.  
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               The security of the blind signature scheme proposed by us is based both on the 
difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem as well as the strength of the hash function 
used in its implementation. Our scheme also has two important properties, untraceability & 
unforgability , along with the basic properties of any digital signature scheme that are integrity 
and authentication . 
1.1    Motivation 
In 1994, Carmenisch et al. proposed blind signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm 
problem (DLP) [7], whose security was based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm 
problem. Later, Harn showed that the blind signatures proposed by Carmenisch et al. could not 
meet the requirement of untraceability[8] . But, Horster et al. claimed that Harn’s cryptanalysis 
was not correct [9] . When the signer traces the signature, he will obtain two pairs of signed 
messages that were satisfied by the equation of Harn's cryptanalysis. Therefore, the signer 
cannot trace back to the owner of the signature. However, Cheng-Chi Lee, Min-Shiang Hwang 
and Wei-Pang Yang have shown that Horster's comment is improper [1]  , the signer can record 
all information when the requester requests the blind signature to the signer and if he wants to 
know the owner of the signature, he still can use Harn's method. Cheng-Chi Lee , Min-Shiang 
Hwang and Wei-Pang Yang have also designed a blind signature scheme which not only 
overcomes the shortcoming of Carmenisch et al.'s scheme, but also achieves the properties, 
blindness and untraceability [1] .     
       Today , due to the increasing number of applications of blind signatures , how to design a 
blind signature based on the discrete logarithm for untraceability is still an open question . Our 
aim is to propose and implement a new novel blind signature scheme based on DLP with 
untraceability which would be less complex & faster than Lee , Hwang  & Yang„s  scheme [1] 
by reducing the number of computations as well as keeping them simple , such that our scheme 
can be used for developing E- Voting , E- Cash and other applications .     
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2.   Literature Survey 
2.1    Cryptography 
Cryptography, in simple terms ,  can be defined as the practice & study of techniques of 
converting ordinary (in most cases , meaningful) text into unintelligible gibberish . Here, the 
ordinary information which gets converted is called as the plain text and the unintelligible output 
of the conversion is called the cipher text. This technique of conversion is also known as 
encryption , while the reverse technique of retrieving the original text from the cipher text is 
called as decryption . Earlier, cryptography mainly focused on these two processes that is 
encryption & decryption , and aimed at achieving mainly , confidentiality . But , in the modern 
era , with the development of technology as well as needs of many applications , this field has 
has expanded to include the properties of integrity , non-repudiation , authentication , security 
etc. along with confidentiality , and as such three different standard mechanisms have been 
proposed [13,14]. 
 Symmetric Key Cryptography 
 Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
 Hashing 
2.1.1   Symmetric Key Cryptography  
In this type of cryptography, the same key is shared between the sender & the receiver, and is 
used for data transmission between the two. That means, the key used by the sender to encrypt 
the message, is also used by the receiver to decrypt the encrypted message. Encryption is done 
by some algorithm as chosen by the sender. Here, the security & confidentiality of the technique 
lie with the secrecy of the common key, so it has to be shared between the sender & receiver via 
a secure channel.  
2.1.2   Asymmetric Key Cryptography  
In this type of cryptography, instead of one key, two keys are used , one is called the private key 
& the other is called the public key . Here , the sender uses the public key of the receiver to 
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encrypt the message and sends it to the receiver , which is then decrypted by the receiver using 
his private key , in order to obtain the original message , as shown in the figure 1.[13,14] . This 
technique is also called the Public key cryptography. 
2.1.3   Hashing 
A third type of cryptographic algorithm is also available known as the cryptographic hash 
functions . Messages of any length can be provided as input, which are used to produce a short 
fixed length output called as hash or message digest. These are used mainly in digital signatures. 
For a strong & good hash function, an attacker cannot find two messages which produce the 
same message digest or hash. Examples include MD4, MD5, SHA-1 family, SHA-2 family, etc. 
2.2    Cryptanalysis 
Like cryptography includes the techniques of covering, hiding or disguising the original message 
for achieving confidentiality, cryptanalysis includes the techniques of uncovering the hidden 
messages, without the information of the secret parameters that are normally required to obtain 
the message. The goal of cryptanalysis is to find some weakness or insecurity in a cryptographic 
scheme, in order to crack the code. For this, one has to acquire a good knowledge of the system , 
how it works and finding the secret key . A wide variety of cryptanalytic attacks are available 
which can be classified into various groups, mainly based on what the attacker knows and what 
capabilities are available to him . Examples are chosen ciphertext attacks, chosen plaintext 
attacks, ciphertext only attack , known plaintext attack , etc . Cryptanalysis not only refers to 
penetrating the security of normal encryption , but also many other types of cryptographic 
algorithms and protocols . Though it mainly uses weaknesses in the algorithm themselves , other 
types of attacks which do not target the weaknesses in algorithm are often more effective than 
them , and thus are important too [13,14] .  
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2.3    Security Services 
The International Telecommunication Union – Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-
T) provides some security services as well as some mechanisms to implement those services. 
The security services include the followings.  
 Data Confidentiality 
 Data Integrity 
 Authentication 
 Non repudiation 
 Access Control 
2.3.1   Data Confidentiality 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines Confidentiality in ISO-17799 as 
ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized to have access  and preventing its 
disclosure to unauthorized agents. Confidentiality is one of the design goals for many 
cryptosystems & it is one of the main principles of information security. This service may 
encompass confidentiality of the whole message or a part of it as well as protection against 
disclosure attack, traffic analysis & snooping [13,14] . 
2.3.2   Data Integrity 
It is defined as a service used for protection of data from unauthorized modification, insertion, 
deletion or replaying by an advisory, and it may encompass either the whole message or a part of 
it. 
2.3.3   Authentication 
This service is used to validate that both parties are who they claim to be. A peer entity 
authentication takes place in a connection oriented communication where it provides the 
authentication of the sender or receiver during connection establishment. A data origin 
authentication takes place in a connectionless communication where only the source of data is 
authenticated. 
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2.3.4   Non-repudiation 
This service protects against repudiation by either the sender or the receiver of the data. In non-
repudiation with proof of the origin, the receiver of the data can later prove the identity of the 
sender if denied, while with proof of delivery, the sender of data can later prove that data were 
delivered to the intended recipient [13,14]. Mechanisms to implement non-repudiation mainly 
include digital signatures, public key encryptions, etc. 
2.3.5   Access Control 
Access to protected information must be restricted to people who are authorized to access the 
information. Access control provides protection against unauthorized access to data . The term 
access in this definition is very broad and can involve reading, writing, modifying, executing 
programs, etc. [13,14] . 
2.4    Digital Signature 
Just like physical signatures validate physical printed documents, Digital signatures are digitally 
or electronically generated security marks which validate digital documents. A digital signature 
can be defined as a mathematical scheme used to verify the authenticity of a message or 
document. If a receiver can verify the digital signature of a sender successfully, then he can trust 
or believe that the message has come from a trusted or known sender. A digital signature is 
similar to a handwritten signature in many aspects , but there are some distinctions between them 
like , a digital signature is much more highly secure than a handwritten signature . While a 
handwritten signature can be forged, it is very difficult and infeasible (in case of strong digital 
signature schemes) to forge a digital signature. Also, while a handwritten signature is part of the 
document containing the message, digital signatures are sent as a separate document different 
from that of the message. Moreover, while there is a one-to-many relationship between a 
conventional signature and documents, a digital signature has a one-to-one relationship with the 
message. 
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Digital signatures use public key encryption systems in order to authenticate & verify digital 
documents & messages like e-mails etc. A typical digital signature scheme consists mainly of 
three algorithms:    
 A key generation algorithm: - used to generate the public & private keys . 
 A signing algorithm: - used to produce the signature using the message & the private 
keys. 
 A verification algorithm: - verifies the signature using the message , public keys & the 
signature . Upon successful verification, accepts the message, else rejects it. 
      Here the type of cryptography used is asymmetric since, there are two types of keys 
involved, one is the private key to sign the message, & the other is the public key used to verify 
the signature.      
       Though there are many algorithms & schemes available & can be used , but usually a digital 
signature is implemented using cryptographic hash functions . Message digests of fixed size are 
created like 128 bits, 256 bits, 512 bits, etc. Which are then sent along with the message to  
 
Figure 1 : Digital Signature Scheme 
 
 
16 
 
the receiver after encrypting the digest with the sender‟s private key . The receiver then 
calculates the hash of the message received & compares with the signature digest after 
decrypting it with the public key. If both are same, then the message is authenticated and 
unmodified , and if they are different , then either the sender is different or the message has been 
modified during transmission . 
       Digital signatures have found many applications in industries, various organizations etc. 
mainly due to the three services they provide that are authentication, non-repudiation & integrity. 
The various applications where they can be used include electronic voting, electronic cash 
schemes, software distributions, e-mails, etc. where detecting forgery or tampering is of prime 
importance.    
2.5    Blind Signature 
2.5.1   Definition 
David Chaum [2] was the first to introduce or propose the concept of blind signatures. In normal 
digital signatures, where only two entities are involved & the sender signs the message , we 
assume that the sender & receiver know each other and the receiver trusts the sender . But in 
many cases this may not be true, that is both the entities may not know or trust each other . In 
this case, the role of a trusted third party comes into the picture , whom both the sender & 
receiver know and trust . Here, the trusted third party acts as the signer & generates his private & 
public keys. Upon receiving a message from the sender, he signs it using his private keys & then 
either sends it to the receiver himself, or sends it back to the sender who then sends the signed 
message to the receiver. The receiver then verifies the signature using the public keys of the 
signer. But, in this case the signer can see or know the contents of the message. In most of the 
applications, the sender would like his message to remain confidential or secret, and even the 
trusted third party or signing authority should not know the contents of his message. Here, the 
use of blind signatures comes into effect. Blind signatures are a special type of digital signatures 
where the message is blinded or disguised before being sent for signing . The message is blinded 
using various techniques & the private keys of the sender. The signer cannot see the contents of 
the message , he signs on the blinded message with his private keys , and sends it back to the 
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sender . The sender then obtains an unblinded version of the signature using his keys , and sends 
the signature – message pair to the receiver . The receiver verifies the signature using the public 
keys of signer as well as the message – signature pair itself.      
 
Figure 2: Concept of Blind Signature 
2.5.2   Properties 
Apart from providing the services like authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, message 
confidentiality etc., some additional properties are there, which if incorporated in the blind 
signature scheme will make them stronger as well as more useful for various applications. 
 Unlinkability or Untraceability :- By this property , the signer cannot trace the sender of 
the message after the message-signature pair has been sent to the receiver as well as 
cannot determine whether an unblinded version of message was signed by him or not , if 
called upon to verify the same . 
 Anonymity :- Due to the above property of untraceability , the identity of the sender can 
remain secret after the message has been received . This is important for applications 
where anonymity is very essential , like in electronic voting applications . 
 Unforgability :- This property can be achieved by using some techniques or methods 
such as hashing , discrete logarithm problems etc. in the blind signature scheme , so that 
any attacker is not able to forge a signature & claim to be the sender .  
2.5.3   Mechanism 
A blind signature scheme disguises the message before sending it to the signing authority in 
order to preserve the secrecy of the message. 
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Participants : Basically , three entities participate in a blind signature scheme , the sender , who 
blinds the message before it gets signed & unblinds the signature received , the signer , who 
signs the blinded message , and the receiver , who verifies the signature & accepts or rejects the 
message accordingly .  
A blind signature scheme typically consists of the following five phases:-  
 Key Generation :- In this phase , the signer produces his private & public keys set . The 
private keys would be used for the signing of the message , while the public keys would 
be used for verification of the signature . The public keys are made available in the 
channel , so that the sender & receiver can get them . 
 Blinding :- In this phase , the sender creates his own private & public keys as required by 
him , in order to blind or disguise  the original message  , using some algorithm or 
technique . He uses his own private keys as well as the public keys of the signer to blind 
the message . He then sends the blinded message to the signer. 
 Signing :- After receiving the blinded message from the sender , the signer signs on it 
using his private keys & some signing algorithm . Then he sends the signature to the 
sender . 
 Unblinding :- After receiving the signature on blinded message from the signer , the 
sender tries to obtain an unblinded version of the signature , i.e. the signature as it would 
have been if signed on original unblinded message . He does this using his keys & an  
unblinding algorithm . Finally , he sends the message - signature pair to the receiver .  
 Verification :- After receiving the message – signature pair , the receiver uses some 
verification equation or algorithm to verify the signature using the signer‟s public keys as 
well as the message - signature pair itself . Then he accepts or rejects the message 
accordingly. 
2.5.4   Applications 
Blind signatures can be used in many applications , where authentication , integrity , non 
repudiation , sender privacy , etc. are necessary , like e-mails , e-cash systems , software 
distributions , documents verification etc. Blind signatures having the additional properties like 
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untraceability, can be used in applications where anonymity of the sender is required like 
electronic voting, etc. 
2.6    Cryptographic Background 
2.6.1   Random Number Generation 
A random number generator is a computational algorithm, program or device used to generate a 
sequence of numbers having no pattern between them, i.e., they appear random . 
Due to the large number of applications of randomness, a lot of methods have been developed 
over the years. Like in ancient times, dice , coins , playing cards , etc. were used for getting 
randomness . But with the increase in use & demand for generating large number of random 
numbers in short amount of time, these physical methods were rather inefficient & time 
consuming . But with the advancement in the technology & computer science , computational 
random number generators (RNGS) are available now , which are used in a wide variety of 
applications like government-run lotteries , games , modern slot machines , gambling , statistical 
sampling , computer simulations , completely randomized designs , cryptography , & in other 
fields or areas where unpredictability is required in the generation of outputs . 
Random number Generation plays an important role in blind signature schemes. All the keys, 
both private & public, of the sender or signer are generated randomly using RNGs. This also 
helps in imparting the property of untraceability to the scheme. Each time a signer signs a 
message , due to randomness , the signatures generated are different from each other and thus no 
outsider can reveal the identity of the signer from the signature , neither can he determine 
whether two signatures are signed by the same signer or not . 
2.6.2   Primality Test 
A primality test is an algorithm to determine whether a given number is prime or not . It is very 
important in cryptography & has also got uses in various other fields of mathematics. This test 
does not give the prime factors of the number, rather only states that whether it is prime or not. 
Primality testing is comparatively easier (running time is polynomial in size of input) than 
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factorization which is a computationally difficult problem. Some tests prove that a number is 
prime , while others like Miller-Rabin test prove that a number is composite . 
Primality tests are generally of two types, deterministic which always outputs that a given 
number is prime or composite and probabilistic which always gives correct results for a prime 
number but may falsely identify a composite as a prime number , though with very small amount 
of probability. Examples of deterministic tests include Agrawal , Kayal and Saxena s algorithm , 
and that of probabilistic include Fermat s  Test , Square root test , Miller-Rabin Test , etc . 
2.6.3   Discrete Logarithm 
In mathematics, specifically in abstract algebra and its applications, discrete 
logarithms are group-theoretic analogues of ordinary logarithms. In particular, an ordinary 
logarithm loga(b) is a solution of the equation a
x
 = b over the real or complex numbers. 
Similarly, if g and h are elements of a finite cyclic group G then a solution x of the 
equation g
x
 = h is called a discrete logarithm to the base g of h in the group G. 
In general, let G be a finite cyclic group with n elements. We assume that the group is written 
multiplicatively. Let b be a generator of G; then every element g of G can be written in the 
form g = b
k
 for some integer k. Furthermore, any two such integers k1 and k2 representing g will 
be congruent modulo n. We can thus define a function , 
 logb : G  Zn  
(where Zn denotes the ring of integers modulo n) by assigning to each g the congruence 
class of k modulo n. This function is a group isomorphism, called the discrete logarithm to 
base b. 
The familiar base change formula for ordinary logarithms remains valid: If c is another generator 
of G, then we have 
logc(g) = logc(b) . logb(g) . 
No efficient classical algorithm for computing general discrete logarithms logb g is known. The 
naive algorithm is to raise b to higher and higher powers k until the desired g is found; this is 
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sometimes called trial multiplication. This algorithm requires running time linear in the size of 
the group G and thus exponential in the number of digits in the size of the group. There exists an 
efficient quantum algorithm due to Peter Shor [15].  
More sophisticated algorithms exist, usually inspired by similar algorithms for integer 
factorization. These algorithms run faster than the naive algorithm, but none of them runs 
in polynomial time (in the number of digits in the size of the group). 
 Baby-step giant-step 
 Pollard's rho algorithm for logarithms 
 Pollard's kangaroo algorithm (aka Pollard's lambda algorithm) 
 Pohlig–Hellman algorithm 
 Index calculus algorithm 
 Number field sieve 
 Function field sieve 
2.6.4   Cryptographic Hash Functions 
A cryptographic hash function is a hash function, that is, an algorithm that takes an arbitrary 
block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string, the (cryptographic) hash value, such that an 
(accidental or intentional) change to the data will (with very high probability) change the hash 
value. The data to be encoded is often called the "message," and the hash value is sometimes 
called the message digest or simply digests. 
The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main or significant properties: 
 it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message 
 it is infeasible to generate a message that has a given hash 
 it is infeasible to modify a message without changing the hash 
 it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash 
Cryptographic hash functions have many information security applications, notably in digital 
signatures , message authentication codes (MACs), and other forms of authentication. They can 
also be used as ordinary hash functions, to index data in hash tables, for fingerprinting, to detect 
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duplicate data or uniquely identify files, and as checksums to detect accidental data corruption. 
Indeed, in information security contexts, cryptographic hash values are sometimes called 
(digital) fingerprints, checksums, or just hash values, even though all these terms stand for 
functions with rather different properties and purposes. 
Examples of cryptographic hash functions include MD-2 , MD-4 , MD-5 , SHA-0 , SHA-1 , 
SHA-256 (where the digest is of size 256 bits) , SHA-512 (where the digest is of size 512 bits) , 
etc. 
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3   Blind Signature Scheme with Untraceability 
A typical blind signature scheme consists of three participants, the sender (or requester) , the 
receiver & the signer . In this scheme , the sender performs the tasks of blinding  & unblinding , 
the signer signs the blinded message and the receiver verifies the signature & then accepts or 
rejects the message . With the added property of untraceability , the sender of the message cannot 
be traced after the delivery of the message . 
 
3.1    Review of Lee , Hwang & Yang s scheme [1] 
3.1.1   Algorithm 
The scheme consists of the three participants, the sender (or requester) , the receiver & the signer 
and has five phases :- 
1. Key Generation ( done by Signer )  :- 
i. Two large primes p  & q  are generated , such that q  | ( 1p  ) . 
ii. Then  we  generate  g   such  that  g   ε  *qZ  . 
iii. Then Signer generates his secret  key  x  ,  &  public key  mod
xy g p . 
iv. Then he generates  1 'k  , 2 'k   , 1b  ,  2b   ε qZ  . 
v. Then he calculates :- 
                                  
1
1r =g mod
k p

 
                              & 22 =g mod
kr p
  , such that  gcd   r ,  q  = 1i . 
vi. Then he sends   1r   , 2r    ,  1b  
&  2b  
to requester for blinding . 
2.  Blinding ( done by Requester ) :- 
i. The Requester has his message , let‟s denote it by ' 'm  . 
ii. He generates  a  , b , c  , d , e  randomly . 
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iii. He calculates:-        
                             
1
1 1= r  mod
ab cr g p
 
                             
2
2 2= r  mod
bb er g p
 
                             1 2
( * ) moddr r r p
 
iv. Then he generates blinded message as follows :- 
                            
1
1 1 ( / 2)* modm mr r ad q
 
 
                             
1
2 2 ( / 2)* modm mr r bd q
 
 
v. Then he sends 
1m
  & 
2m   to signer for signing . 
3. Signing ( by Signer ) :- 
i. The signer generates signatures as follows :- 
                     1 1 1 1 1
mods xr k b m q    
                       
                    2 2 2 2 2
mods xr k b m q    
 
ii. Then he sends 1s & 2s  to requester for unblinding . 
4. Unblinding( by Requester ) :- 
i. The requester unblinds the signature as follows : - 
                    
1
1 1 1 ( / 2) mods s r r cdm q
 
  
                    
1
2 2 2 ( / 2) mods s r r edm q
 
  
                    1 2
mods s s q 
 
ii. The requester then sends the whole signature ( m  , r  , s  ) to the receiver . 
5. Verification ( by Receiver ) :- 
i. The receiver checks if ( )mods r mg y r p . 
ii. If it comes true, then the receiver knows that the message comes from an 
authenticated or authorised sender. 
 
This scheme not only overcomes the shortcoming of Carmenisch et al.'s [7] scheme, but also 
achieves the properties, blindness and untraceability [1] . 
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3.2    Proposed Scheme 
3.2.1   Algorithm 
Our scheme also consists of the three participants , the sender(or requester) , the receiver & the 
signer and has the following five phases :- 
1. Initialization ( by Signer ) :- 
a) The signer randomly selects  large primes 1p & 2p such that 
                     1 2.n p p  
 ,                       
                     2 1p n 
 
, and p  is prime. 
b) Then he selects private keys  x  , r  & public keys  
                         modxy g p , and 
                         modrh g p , where g is a large prime selected by signer randomly. 
c) Then he sends public key set ( , , , ,p g y n h ) to the requester (who wants his message to 
be signed). 
 
2. Blinding ( by Requester ) :- 
 Suppose a requester wants to obtain a signature on message m . The steps are: 
             a)   He selects private keys ,a b
 
& w  randomly and computes   
(i)  1 ( mod , )mod
a bu H hg y p m n , where H is a cryptographic  hash                                     
function ( preferably SHA-512 ) . 
(ii)  2 1 modu u b n  . 
(iii)  modwk g p  . 
             b)  Then he sends ( 2u ), the blinded message, to the signer. 
 
3. Signing ( by Signer ) :- 
After receiving ( 2u ) from requester, the signer computes 
    2( )modz r u x n  , and sends z to requester . 
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4. Un-blinding ( by Requester ) :- 
 
a) After receiving z , the requester computes 
              modz z a w n     . 
b) Then he sends ( 1, ,z u k ) as the Blind signature on message m , to the receiver . 
 
5. Verification ( by Receiver ) :- 
           The signature‟s authenticity can be verified by checking the following equation:- 
                              1 1
1( ( ) mod , )mod mod
uzH g y k p m n u n
     . 
Correctness : 
The proof of equality is as follows:- 
LHS = 
1 1( ( ) mod , )moduzH g y k p m n
  
   
        = 
1 1( ( ) mod , )moduz a wH g y k p m n     
        = 
2 1 1( ( ) mod , )modu x ua w rH g g g g y k p m n   
        = 
1 11( ( ) ( ) mod , )modxu ua xbH hg kk g g y p m n  
        = 
1 1( ( ) mod , )modu ua bH hg y y y p m n  
        = ( mod , )mod
a bH hg y p m n  
        = 1
modu n
. 
        = RHS.  
Thus the correctness of the scheme is proved. 
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The following figure (figure- 1) is an overall representation of our scheme : - 
 
Figure - 3 
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3.2.2   Security Analysis 
        The security of our scheme is based both on the strength of the hash function and the 
difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem [7,10,11,12]. 
Untraceability :- 
         In our scheme , it is infeasible for the signer to trace the blind signature , which is 
demonstrated as follows : For each blinded message that is sent to the signer , he can keep a 
record of the values : ( 2 ,u z ) , and when the requester reveals ( 1, , ,z u k m ) to receiver/public , he 
(signer) can calculate a value , b from 2 1 modb u u n    . 
         But from zand z , he can calculate the value  moda w z z n     . From k , he can‟t 
calculate wdue to the difficulty of discrete logarithm problem . So, since w is unknown, a can‟t 
be calculated, so he can‟t trace the message by using 1 ( mod , )mod
a bu H hg y p m n
 
 . 
         Therefore, our algorithm satisfies the property of untraceability. 
Forgery attack analysis :- 
          We are using SHA-512 as our hash function and its strength is based on the fact that, given 
a message digest or hash value, it is infeasible to get the message from it. 
 Based on discrete logarithm problem, given y and g , it is infeasible to compute x  
(private key) from modxy g p . 
 For passing the verification equation: 
1 1
1( ( ) mod , )mod mod
uzH g y k p m n u n
    , 
successfully , an attacker has to randomly choose any two values from 1,z u and k , and 
compute the third one . 
             1. If he chooses zand 1u randomly, then it is infeasible to find k , since hash function is    
non-invertible . 
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             2. If he chooses k and either zor 1u , then similarly it is infeasible to find 1u or z , 
respectively , due to the hash function as well as due to the difficulty of solving the discrete 
logarithm problem . 
 Given a valid signature ( z , 1u , k , m ) , it is infeasible to derive another valid signature    (
z ,
1u
 , k  , m ) such that 1 1 1( ( ) ( ) mod , )mod mod
uzH g y k p m n u n
      , due to the 
infeasibility of inverting the hash function . 
3.2.3   Performance Comparison 
Type of 
Computation 
Lee , Hwang & Yang’s 
scheme 
Proposed scheme 
Multiplication  29M 7M 
Exponentiation  11E 7E 
Hash  0H 2H 
Inverse  3I 1I 
Table 1 : Comparative study of Computational Complexities 
Our proposed scheme uses lesser number of operations than Lee , Hwang & Yang‟s scheme  and 
thus the total execution time will be lesser than their scheme . 
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Chapter 4 
 
Implementation Details 
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4   Implementation Details 
4.1    Lee , Hwang & Yang’s scheme’s Output 
 
Figure 4 
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4.2    Our Proposed scheme’s output 
4.2.1   Key Generation 
 
Figure 5 : Key Generation Phase 
4.2.2   Blinding 
 
Figure 6 : Blinding Phase 
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4.2.3   Signing 
 
Figure 7 : Signing Phase 
4.2.4   Unblinding 
 
Figure 8 : Unblinding Phase 
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4.2.5   Verification 
 
Figure 9 : Verification Phase 
4.3    Comparison with Lee , Hwang & Yang’s scheme 
Phase Lee , Hwang & 
Yang’s scheme 
Proposed 
scheme 
Blinding 44.0 111.0 
Signing 0.0 2.0 
Unblinding 17.0 1.0 
Verification 1932.0 42.0 
Total 1993.0 156.0 
Signature Length        
(in bytes) 
130 193 
 
Table 2 : Execution time (in milliseconds) comparison for a message size of 29404 bytes . 
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We have implemented Lee, Hwang and Yang‟s scheme [1] as well as our proposed scheme and 
found out the execution times for various phases along with the signature length for different 
message sizes. Here, existing refers to Lee, Hwang and Yang‟s scheme [1] and proposed refers to 
our scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
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5   Conclusion 
We have proposed a new blind signature scheme based on discrete logarithm problem for 
untraceability. The security of our scheme is based both on the difficulty of solving the discrete 
logarithm problem as well as the strength and security of hash functions. Our scheme not only 
provides untraceability but also unforgability. It can be used in various applications like e-voting 
and e-cash systems etc. 
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